Making Sense of the Inability of COPE to Cope
By Nontando Ngamlana
Voting outcomes in South Africa have stubbornly resisted ‘de-racialisation’ over the years resulting in the continued electoral dominance of the ANC over weak and fragmented opposition parties. Concerns have been raised to the effect that a genuine multiparty competition is, under the circumstances, limited and that potential for an alteration of power through the ballot is diminishing frighteningly fast. The emergence of the Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008 shifted the balance of scale in South Africa’s opposition politics and renewed hopes that a significant opposition to the ANC was finally in the offing. For the first time since 1994, the ANC failed to secure a two-third majority vote.
The high hopes associated with the entry of COPE into the fray, however, appear to have been misplaced. South Africans have over the past few months witnessed the descent of a once-proud movement into the morass of populism, opportunism, ever-increasing corruption and ideological incoherence. Observers are almost at a loss on just what is ailing this once promising outfit.
This article aims to delve into some of the possible factors contributing to the rather unedifying state of the Party. Firstly, it would be useful to investigate the circumstances underpinning the birth of COPE, which can be traced back to the 52nd ANC national conference in Polokwane in December 2007. The conference is notably the ground in which bitter rivalry of leadership in the ANC reached a climax. Two distinct factions emerged during the conference—the Zuma and Mbeki factions. The Zuma faction emerged the winner in the chaotic contest that ensued.
More than just highlighting the different factions within the ANC, the conference also brought to the fore the diametrically opposed philosophies between Mbeki and Zuma. These included differences in both style and economic policy – Mbeki pursued neoliberal policies and was known for an aloof personality and plotting against his opponents, while Zuma was seen to be more left-wing and populist, and had a closer relationship with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
One may also recall the many trips Zuma made to court while facing corruption charges in relation to a multi-billion rand arms deal with French manufacturer, Thint. The 2008 landmark ruling by high court judge Chris Nicholson found that the re-charging of Zuma by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was illegal and was unduly influenced by Mbeki due to political motives. The case against Zuma was thus dismissed. As a consequence of the judge’s findings of political interference, the ANC recalled Mbeki as the country’s president. Many members of Mbeki’s cabinet resigned their posts at the same time in solidarity, including Vice-president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and other senior cabinet ministers.
The recall of Mbeki brought to the fore simmering tensions within the ANC. Mosioua Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa, Mluleki George and others broke away from the ANC to form a new party. This move gained support from many Mbeki supporters who started handing in their resignations from the ANC to join the ‘Shikota movement’ as it was then termed.
It was only after the Sandton Convention in November 2008 that COPE was formerly launched. This conference was planned for 4,000 delegates but more than 5,000 attended with some people struggling to get into the venue. In attendance at this conference were major political figures, including delegates from other parties except the ANC. In December 2008, COPE was officially formed during a three-day conference and Lekota was named interim president.
In terms of policy ideals, in an interview with the Sunday Times, Lekota stated that the ideology of the party would be one that embraced multiracial, multicultural participation in governance, promoting a free market and disavowed themselves from any connections to Marxism. According to the party’s manifesto flyer, COPE’s campaign topics for 2009 elections were maintaining the constitutional status quo, tackling unemployment, job satisfaction, poverty, the environment, secondary and tertiary education, health care in general, women empowerment, youth development, family values, and future non-racialism. This agenda was well accepted and supported by many South Africans and as a new party, COPE looked like it had properly identified gaps and developmental challenges in South Africa and was gearing to meet them.
The main distinction between COPE and the ANC was that COPE favoured a system in which top-level government officials are elected directly; by public election, and officials can only be removed by courts of justice, whereas the current situation under the ruling ANC is that top-level government officials are appointed and can be removed from office by the political parties themselves.
Within a few months of its formation, COPE appeared ready to compete with the other parties in the 2009 elections with other parties; in fact, it emerged amongst the strongest and was neck-to-neck with both the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA). For all the hype, the party performed below par during the elections but many gave it the benefit of a doubt because it had not had a long time to prepare for the gruelling elections. It would appear as though problems in COPE emerged as the party approached its first elective conference. The conference was initially planned for December 2010, but the youth movement within the Party, with the backing from Gauteng and some Congress National Committee (CNC) members convinced the party to bring the date forward.
Quoting from a document titled Cope in 2010: The quality of leadership we need, the Mail & Guardian states that the youth movement called for the election of leaders who would reflect the “future” of the party and not the “past.” “If our leadership collective merely reflects people who left the ANC, especially in our top twelve positions, we will lose the confidence of many South Africans who pinned their hopes on the emergence of something new.”
The youth movement list preferred current deputy president Shilowa to ascend to the presidency—a case of déjà vu wouldn’t you say? Remember that as the ANC was approaching the Polokwane conference, it was the ANC Youth League that strongly preferred Zuma (then ANC deputy president) to ascend to the position of presidency with Malema even vowing to “kill for Zuma.” The COPE’s youth movement did not include current president Mosiuoa Lekota in their list of preferred candidates; instead they preferred him to lead the Council of the Elders, a structure that would be the equivalent to the ANC’s new Veteran’s League.
Divisions within the party became evident as a faction within the youth movement emerged as a pro-Lekota group and circulated its own preferred list of candidates, with Lekota as a presidential candidate, Pumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as his deputy and Dandala as national chairperson.
As the elective conference drew nearer, it became clear that Shilowa was gaining support as more provinces were backing him. Provinces believed that Lekota was no longer the ideal party leader. Eastern Cape’s chairperson of the party’s interim leadership was quoted by the Mail & Guardian stating that Lekota must give way to new leadership. “There are different leaders for different occasions. The demands of the day require a different leader.” He said that if the party failed to convince the public that it was politically relevant, voters would find an alternative.
Some of the issues that were counted by the youth movement in support of their move to oust Lekota are that:
- He failed to build branches as mandated by the party after the elections in 2009.
- He is unable to articulate the party’s black economic empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action positions.
- He is a divisive leader, he allowed his supporters to print T-shirts carrying an image of his face and a “100% Lekota” slogan. That was against the resolutions of the Bloemfontein conference.
- He is a bad loser who habitually sides with the disgruntled and disaffected.
As the leadership debate within COPE intensified, it was clear that there were two distinct factions, a Lekota and a Shilowa group. Again, a scenario we witnessed not so long ago in the ANC with the Zuma and the Mbeki factions at play. It was at this point that it became clear that there were no clear systems and policies to handle this within COPE. When a similar situation occurred in the ANC, the party was quick to revert back to their old tested systems of unifying its members and exercised their existing rules and regulations to deal with discipline issues that emerged.
The murkiest of fights within COPE ensued as Lekota accused Shilowa of crookery and lying. Some would want us to believe that it was just a healthy debate. Of course the motive behind this mudslinging was nothing more than a bitter battle for positions and power. It makes one question the motives of these men (and women) for leaving the ANC. As for Lekota and Shilowa, it became clear that their partnership was based on petulance, dented egos, an incoherent vision and expedience.
The biggest bone of contention as the party approached the national conference was the setting up of the credentials system for voting delegates. Because the conference had been moved forward, the preparation period had also been shortened which resulted in numerous problems arising around the auditing of branches and the development of a credentials system. Because of the problems with the branch auditing process, the national elective conference ended up being a conference just on policy. It was at this conference that supporters of Shilowa passed a vote of no confidence on Lekota and moved to put Shilowa as interim party president, a decision which was overturned by the courts.
What seems to have been the real challenge in COPE is that as a new party, it did not immediately focus on developing its policy documents as well as put in place clear rules and regulations. The initial focus of the party at the time of its formation was the elections and positioning itself as a preferred opposition party. When the elections were over, the party had to then settle in parliament and organise itself there. Eventually, as it was beginning to focus on policies, defining the party and its role, and on developing rules and regulations, it mistakenly moved to bring the conference date forward. Of course, at the time it was not ready for an elective conference. Processes such as the membership audits and the development of acceptable credentials system were not in place. It is instructive that most COPE members left the ANC because they felt the credentials process in Polokwane was flawed, and therefore they were bound to demand that things be done differently in COPE.
It was, therefore, inevitable that in a case where the party disagreed and came to loggerheads, and where there were no clear rules and regulations to refer to, the courts would have to decide. COPE now sees itself muddled up in a force-based leadership situation, where the courts get to decide on its leadership.
As if the woes in COPE as narrated above were not enough, after failing to convince the two top men dividing COPE, Rev. Dandala (the Party’s parliamentary leader) decided he had had enough. Compared with church politics, what was going on within COPE was more than he could handle; he resigned. Some critics claim that it was a terrible mistake for Dandala to leave the pulpit in the first place, let alone lie in the same bed with disgruntled Shilowa and Lekota. But as history would show us, it is not uncommon for the ‘men of God’ to give up the pulpit for politics. The likes of Rev. Dube and Rev. Xuma, past presidents of the ANC; Rev. Mdolomba and Rev. Calata, past secretary-generals of the ANC; currently we have the likes of Rev. Stofile, once premier of the Eastern Cape and now sports minister to mention, but a few. So, getting involved directly in politics was not necessarily a misstep on Rev Dandala’s part.
We also need to note that the tumult in COPE is not new phenomenon in South African politics. Similar scenarios have played themselves out numerous times in the ANC. The difference has only been that as a well established political party, the ANC had clear rules and regulations, well articulated and understood policies and systems that had been tested and improved over time. Within the ANC things are dealt with internally through various platforms and are seldom allowed to reach the courts. For a new party such as COPE such systems do not exist.
What is also becoming clear is that the escalating levels of ‘thuggery and thievery’ that currently characterise South African politics are unfortunately also cascading into COPE as well. Those in power want to hang on to it at all costs, and those who are not in power will do just about any scheming and plotting to get there.
Those who saw a glimpse of hope and light in South African opposition politics with the emergence of COPE seemingly counted their chicks before they hatched. Echoing the words of Andile Nkuhlu, Eastern Cape provincial chair of COPE, when he resigned from the party, there is “a deep sense of disappointment and revulsion that an idea of an opposition party was betrayed by a coterie of leaders hell-bent on greed for power, position and survival politics and devoid of principle and being servants of the people.”
COPE may with time find its footing from the downward spiralling slope it is sliding in, and like many other parties, learn to cope. For now, it is evidently not coping.
Voting outcomes in South Africa have stubbornly resisted ‘de-racialisation’ over the years resulting in the continued electoral dominance of the ANC over weak and fragmented opposition parties. Concerns have been raised to the effect that a genuine multiparty competition is, under the circumstances, limited and that potential for an alteration of power through the ballot is diminishing frighteningly fast. The emergence of the Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008 shifted the balance of scale in South Africa’s opposition politics and renewed hopes that a significant opposition to the ANC was finally in the offing. For the first time since 1994, the ANC failed to secure a two-third majority vote.
The high hopes associated with the entry of COPE into the fray, however, appear to have been misplaced. South Africans have over the past few months witnessed the descent of a once-proud movement into the morass of populism, opportunism, ever-increasing corruption and ideological incoherence. Observers are almost at a loss on just what is ailing this once promising outfit.
This article aims to delve into some of the possible factors contributing to the rather unedifying state of the Party. Firstly, it would be useful to investigate the circumstances underpinning the birth of COPE, which can be traced back to the 52nd ANC national conference in Polokwane in December 2007. The conference is notably the ground in which bitter rivalry of leadership in the ANC reached a climax. Two distinct factions emerged during the conference—the Zuma and Mbeki factions. The Zuma faction emerged the winner in the chaotic contest that ensued.
More than just highlighting the different factions within the ANC, the conference also brought to the fore the diametrically opposed philosophies between Mbeki and Zuma. These included differences in both style and economic policy – Mbeki pursued neoliberal policies and was known for an aloof personality and plotting against his opponents, while Zuma was seen to be more left-wing and populist, and had a closer relationship with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).
One may also recall the many trips Zuma made to court while facing corruption charges in relation to a multi-billion rand arms deal with French manufacturer, Thint. The 2008 landmark ruling by high court judge Chris Nicholson found that the re-charging of Zuma by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was illegal and was unduly influenced by Mbeki due to political motives. The case against Zuma was thus dismissed. As a consequence of the judge’s findings of political interference, the ANC recalled Mbeki as the country’s president. Many members of Mbeki’s cabinet resigned their posts at the same time in solidarity, including Vice-president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and other senior cabinet ministers.
The recall of Mbeki brought to the fore simmering tensions within the ANC. Mosioua Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa, Mluleki George and others broke away from the ANC to form a new party. This move gained support from many Mbeki supporters who started handing in their resignations from the ANC to join the ‘Shikota movement’ as it was then termed.
It was only after the Sandton Convention in November 2008 that COPE was formerly launched. This conference was planned for 4,000 delegates but more than 5,000 attended with some people struggling to get into the venue. In attendance at this conference were major political figures, including delegates from other parties except the ANC. In December 2008, COPE was officially formed during a three-day conference and Lekota was named interim president.
In terms of policy ideals, in an interview with the Sunday Times, Lekota stated that the ideology of the party would be one that embraced multiracial, multicultural participation in governance, promoting a free market and disavowed themselves from any connections to Marxism. According to the party’s manifesto flyer, COPE’s campaign topics for 2009 elections were maintaining the constitutional status quo, tackling unemployment, job satisfaction, poverty, the environment, secondary and tertiary education, health care in general, women empowerment, youth development, family values, and future non-racialism. This agenda was well accepted and supported by many South Africans and as a new party, COPE looked like it had properly identified gaps and developmental challenges in South Africa and was gearing to meet them.
The main distinction between COPE and the ANC was that COPE favoured a system in which top-level government officials are elected directly; by public election, and officials can only be removed by courts of justice, whereas the current situation under the ruling ANC is that top-level government officials are appointed and can be removed from office by the political parties themselves.
Within a few months of its formation, COPE appeared ready to compete with the other parties in the 2009 elections with other parties; in fact, it emerged amongst the strongest and was neck-to-neck with both the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA). For all the hype, the party performed below par during the elections but many gave it the benefit of a doubt because it had not had a long time to prepare for the gruelling elections. It would appear as though problems in COPE emerged as the party approached its first elective conference. The conference was initially planned for December 2010, but the youth movement within the Party, with the backing from Gauteng and some Congress National Committee (CNC) members convinced the party to bring the date forward.
Quoting from a document titled Cope in 2010: The quality of leadership we need, the Mail & Guardian states that the youth movement called for the election of leaders who would reflect the “future” of the party and not the “past.” “If our leadership collective merely reflects people who left the ANC, especially in our top twelve positions, we will lose the confidence of many South Africans who pinned their hopes on the emergence of something new.”
The youth movement list preferred current deputy president Shilowa to ascend to the presidency—a case of déjà vu wouldn’t you say? Remember that as the ANC was approaching the Polokwane conference, it was the ANC Youth League that strongly preferred Zuma (then ANC deputy president) to ascend to the position of presidency with Malema even vowing to “kill for Zuma.” The COPE’s youth movement did not include current president Mosiuoa Lekota in their list of preferred candidates; instead they preferred him to lead the Council of the Elders, a structure that would be the equivalent to the ANC’s new Veteran’s League.
Divisions within the party became evident as a faction within the youth movement emerged as a pro-Lekota group and circulated its own preferred list of candidates, with Lekota as a presidential candidate, Pumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as his deputy and Dandala as national chairperson.
As the elective conference drew nearer, it became clear that Shilowa was gaining support as more provinces were backing him. Provinces believed that Lekota was no longer the ideal party leader. Eastern Cape’s chairperson of the party’s interim leadership was quoted by the Mail & Guardian stating that Lekota must give way to new leadership. “There are different leaders for different occasions. The demands of the day require a different leader.” He said that if the party failed to convince the public that it was politically relevant, voters would find an alternative.
Some of the issues that were counted by the youth movement in support of their move to oust Lekota are that:
- He failed to build branches as mandated by the party after the elections in 2009.
- He is unable to articulate the party’s black economic empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action positions.
- He is a divisive leader, he allowed his supporters to print T-shirts carrying an image of his face and a “100% Lekota” slogan. That was against the resolutions of the Bloemfontein conference.
- He is a bad loser who habitually sides with the disgruntled and disaffected.
As the leadership debate within COPE intensified, it was clear that there were two distinct factions, a Lekota and a Shilowa group. Again, a scenario we witnessed not so long ago in the ANC with the Zuma and the Mbeki factions at play. It was at this point that it became clear that there were no clear systems and policies to handle this within COPE. When a similar situation occurred in the ANC, the party was quick to revert back to their old tested systems of unifying its members and exercised their existing rules and regulations to deal with discipline issues that emerged.
The murkiest of fights within COPE ensued as Lekota accused Shilowa of crookery and lying. Some would want us to believe that it was just a healthy debate. Of course the motive behind this mudslinging was nothing more than a bitter battle for positions and power. It makes one question the motives of these men (and women) for leaving the ANC. As for Lekota and Shilowa, it became clear that their partnership was based on petulance, dented egos, an incoherent vision and expedience.
The biggest bone of contention as the party approached the national conference was the setting up of the credentials system for voting delegates. Because the conference had been moved forward, the preparation period had also been shortened which resulted in numerous problems arising around the auditing of branches and the development of a credentials system. Because of the problems with the branch auditing process, the national elective conference ended up being a conference just on policy. It was at this conference that supporters of Shilowa passed a vote of no confidence on Lekota and moved to put Shilowa as interim party president, a decision which was overturned by the courts.
What seems to have been the real challenge in COPE is that as a new party, it did not immediately focus on developing its policy documents as well as put in place clear rules and regulations. The initial focus of the party at the time of its formation was the elections and positioning itself as a preferred opposition party. When the elections were over, the party had to then settle in parliament and organise itself there. Eventually, as it was beginning to focus on policies, defining the party and its role, and on developing rules and regulations, it mistakenly moved to bring the conference date forward. Of course, at the time it was not ready for an elective conference. Processes such as the membership audits and the development of acceptable credentials system were not in place. It is instructive that most COPE members left the ANC because they felt the credentials process in Polokwane was flawed, and therefore they were bound to demand that things be done differently in COPE.
It was, therefore, inevitable that in a case where the party disagreed and came to loggerheads, and where there were no clear rules and regulations to refer to, the courts would have to decide. COPE now sees itself muddled up in a force-based leadership situation, where the courts get to decide on its leadership.
As if the woes in COPE as narrated above were not enough, after failing to convince the two top men dividing COPE, Rev. Dandala (the Party’s parliamentary leader) decided he had had enough. Compared with church politics, what was going on within COPE was more than he could handle; he resigned. Some critics claim that it was a terrible mistake for Dandala to leave the pulpit in the first place, let alone lie in the same bed with disgruntled Shilowa and Lekota. But as history would show us, it is not uncommon for the ‘men of God’ to give up the pulpit for politics. The likes of Rev. Dube and Rev. Xuma, past presidents of the ANC; Rev. Mdolomba and Rev. Calata, past secretary-generals of the ANC; currently we have the likes of Rev. Stofile, once premier of the Eastern Cape and now sports minister to mention, but a few. So, getting involved directly in politics was not necessarily a misstep on Rev Dandala’s part.
We also need to note that the tumult in COPE is not new phenomenon in South African politics. Similar scenarios have played themselves out numerous times in the ANC. The difference has only been that as a well established political party, the ANC had clear rules and regulations, well articulated and understood policies and systems that had been tested and improved over time. Within the ANC things are dealt with internally through various platforms and are seldom allowed to reach the courts. For a new party such as COPE such systems do not exist.
What is also becoming clear is that the escalating levels of ‘thuggery and thievery’ that currently characterise South African politics are unfortunately also cascading into COPE as well. Those in power want to hang on to it at all costs, and those who are not in power will do just about any scheming and plotting to get there.
Those who saw a glimpse of hope and light in South African opposition politics with the emergence of COPE seemingly counted their chicks before they hatched. Echoing the words of Andile Nkuhlu, Eastern Cape provincial chair of COPE, when he resigned from the party, there is “a deep sense of disappointment and revulsion that an idea of an opposition party was betrayed by a coterie of leaders hell-bent on greed for power, position and survival politics and devoid of principle and being servants of the people.”
COPE may with time find its footing from the downward spiralling slope it is sliding in, and like many other parties, learn to cope. For now, it is evidently not coping.