Analysing the Marriage Between the DA and the ID
By Nontando Ngamlana
Following its triumph in 1994, 1999 and 2005, the African National Congress (ANC) was again returned to power in the 2009 general elections, this time with almost two-thirds of the vote which translated to an equally massive representation at the National Assembly. This result appeared to reinforce analysis, which suggested that the ANC was becoming ‘dominant’ and less likely to lose any electoral contest for national power in the foreseeable future.
This in turn aroused fears that the ANC might become increasingly unaccountable, and perhaps increasingly arrogant in its use of state resources. The post-election period saw a robust debate in South Africa on the role of opposition parties, especially given their state of fragmentation.
A number of questions started to be posed:
• Should the opposition parties seek to combine; if so, along what lines and around what principles?
• How should they carry out their opposition task?
• Is there danger that unity amongst particular opposition parties might bring about a further racialisation of South African politics?
Over the years as the ANC continued to win the elections with an overwhelming majority, opposition parties became even more fragmented than ever before. The floor-crossing legislation introduced in parliament further put the opposition parties at a disadvantaged position. The legislation allowed for a member of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures to become a member of another party whilst retaining membership of the Assembly or that of the provincial legislature.
This had a negative impact on smaller opposition parties most of whose members crossed the floor to join the ANC where they perceived better opportunities to be – a greener pasture – than the small opposition parties they were from. In turn, this weakened the voice of opposition parties in parliament while the ANC grew stronger and less accountable.
Since the 2009 elections, opposition parties have been seeking a common ground and evaluating the possibility of stronger future cooperation. This became more evident with the support that opposition parties afforded the Congress of the People (COPE) around the time of its formation. Patricia de Lille, leader of the Independent Democrats (ID) has always led the debate on unifying opposition parties in South Africa. In 2008, she stated that one of the major problems in South African politics had been a complete failure of accountability. She alluded to the fact that politicians have not been held accountable for their promises, ministers have not been sanctioned for non-performance, and no action had been taken against corruption.
One would see truth in De Lille’s analysis of the degeneration of responsible leadership on the part of the ruling party with the complete failure in governance when it came to the electricity crisis and the criminal justice system descending into chaos, the disbanding of the Scorpions, escalation of corruption and poor protection of whistle-blowers, introduction of controversial and oppressive legislation, such as the protection of information bill, being some of the incidences that prove the poor state of affairs in our government.
The need for a stronger opposition has since then taken centre stage in the political discourse, at least in white opposition circles. The discussion concentrates on the situation in parliament and does not take into account opposition from beyond parliament.
The marriage between the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the ID, therefore, comes as no surprise. The DA and ID reached an understanding which would see the ID merge with the DA by 2014. These parties believe that the merger would create a stronger opposition, which would become the ruling party, with time. According to the DA leader Hellen Zille, the main goal of the merger is to offer a united electoral challenge to the ANC. One therefore would ask if this should really be the goal and aim of the DA as the opposition party rather than the enhancement of the quality of our democracy and to hold the ruling party to account.
Seemingly, the DA views itself as an official opposition to the ANC merely because it opposes almost everything that the ruling party does. If the past national elections are anything to go by, the DA is no longer content with its position as the lead opposition party, but it is gearing itself to take over from the ANC. Political commentator, Howard Barrel proclaimed that ‘if the first duty of an opposition party is to oppose, or at the very least test government policy at every turn, its second is presumably to become a ruling party. And as Barrel observed, none of the opposition parties appeared to have any chance of replacing the ANC as government any time soon.’
Analysts of the political discourse in South Africa argue that if the marriage between the ID and the DA is based on the premise that they are to rule in the near future, then it is founded on a shaky ground. What raises concern in this marriage is the fact that fundamentally, these two organisations differ in ideology. Before the merger, De Lille had been a strong critic of both the ANC and the DA. Speaking on their interpretation of their position as an opposition, De Lille had stated that unlike the DA, the ID had never felt comfortable with the idea of ‘opposition’- the idea that their existence was based on opposing something. She claimed that the ID was founded on the basis of positive values; of standing for something as opposed to against something.
The memorandum of understanding signed by the DA and the ID will see a gradual merger of the two parties and both parties will contest the 2011 local government elections under the banner of the DA. A formal merger will only be possible after the 2014 national elections, as constitutional amendments that abolished the floor-crossing would put ID members at risk of losing their seats in provincial legislatures and parliament.
In terms of the merger, elected representatives of the two parties will immediately start attending each other’s caucuses, while a joint committee of DA and ID representatives will oversee finances. An ‘appropriate number’ of ID representatives would be co-opted onto the DA’s highest decision-making bodies such as its National Management Committee, Federal Executive and Federal Council.
Most political analysts see the merger as a survival strategy for the ID after it took a beating during the last general elections, winning less than one percent of the votes and retaining only four of its seven seats in parliament. Meanwhile, the DA increased its political holdings, gaining 17 percent of the vote. The general belief therefore is that instead of watching her party die a slow death, De Lille made a strategic move to merge with the DA. Analysts, however, claim that this move will not necessarily strengthen the DA or even increase its membership. Infact, it is believed that it might have a negative impact.
Some ID members may lose faith in De Lille and feel let down and therefore not join the DA. For a long time the ID had been opposed to most ideological positions of the DA and to the anti-ANC stance that the DA had always held in its attempts to unseat the ruling party. The differences in the two parties have always been strong and therefore many ID members may not be won over to the DA that easily.
The alliance is likely to boost the opposition’s chances of taking control of more municipalities in the Western and Northern Cape, and in holding on to the Western Cape in 2014. This was evident during the recent by-elections in the Western Cape local municipalities where the DA won a majority of the votes in most local municipalities over the ANC. The ANC’s support amongst coloured voters in the Western Cape – even in rural areas – has collapsed dramatically. The ANC has become an African party with very little support amongst members of other race groups. Whether this has something to do with the behaviour of the notorious Julius Malema is not clear. What is clear from the by-elections is that in the Western Cape the ANC has alienated non-African black voters.
The DA seems to have made some gains amongst African voters; these gains are more pronounced in small rural towns than in big cities. The DA still has a lot of work to do to convince African voters that it could possibly represent their interests. The DA is well aware of this and the merger happens at a time when it is struggling to reshape its image as a party serving white and minority interests. Therefore, it sees such arrangements with smaller opposition parties as a means of extending its electoral influence into the townships. The DA is also talking with COPE but these talks have stalled since COPE’s descent into in-fighting and court battles. Besides, COPE must get a mandate from its members first. The UDM remains sceptical of the merger and like all of us, continues to watch the space.
It is not clear how long this marriage will last, but what is clear is that the DA is positioning itself well as the biggest force in opposition politics in the country. This may well be exactly what we need to get the ANC to refocus, and to realise that it should be accountable to the people. However, if the opposition hopes to unseat the ANC in the foreseeable future, the alliance must be broadened and confidence building intensified.
Following its triumph in 1994, 1999 and 2005, the African National Congress (ANC) was again returned to power in the 2009 general elections, this time with almost two-thirds of the vote which translated to an equally massive representation at the National Assembly. This result appeared to reinforce analysis, which suggested that the ANC was becoming ‘dominant’ and less likely to lose any electoral contest for national power in the foreseeable future.
This in turn aroused fears that the ANC might become increasingly unaccountable, and perhaps increasingly arrogant in its use of state resources. The post-election period saw a robust debate in South Africa on the role of opposition parties, especially given their state of fragmentation.
A number of questions started to be posed:
• Should the opposition parties seek to combine; if so, along what lines and around what principles?
• How should they carry out their opposition task?
• Is there danger that unity amongst particular opposition parties might bring about a further racialisation of South African politics?
Over the years as the ANC continued to win the elections with an overwhelming majority, opposition parties became even more fragmented than ever before. The floor-crossing legislation introduced in parliament further put the opposition parties at a disadvantaged position. The legislation allowed for a member of the National Assembly and provincial legislatures to become a member of another party whilst retaining membership of the Assembly or that of the provincial legislature.
This had a negative impact on smaller opposition parties most of whose members crossed the floor to join the ANC where they perceived better opportunities to be – a greener pasture – than the small opposition parties they were from. In turn, this weakened the voice of opposition parties in parliament while the ANC grew stronger and less accountable.
Since the 2009 elections, opposition parties have been seeking a common ground and evaluating the possibility of stronger future cooperation. This became more evident with the support that opposition parties afforded the Congress of the People (COPE) around the time of its formation. Patricia de Lille, leader of the Independent Democrats (ID) has always led the debate on unifying opposition parties in South Africa. In 2008, she stated that one of the major problems in South African politics had been a complete failure of accountability. She alluded to the fact that politicians have not been held accountable for their promises, ministers have not been sanctioned for non-performance, and no action had been taken against corruption.
One would see truth in De Lille’s analysis of the degeneration of responsible leadership on the part of the ruling party with the complete failure in governance when it came to the electricity crisis and the criminal justice system descending into chaos, the disbanding of the Scorpions, escalation of corruption and poor protection of whistle-blowers, introduction of controversial and oppressive legislation, such as the protection of information bill, being some of the incidences that prove the poor state of affairs in our government.
The need for a stronger opposition has since then taken centre stage in the political discourse, at least in white opposition circles. The discussion concentrates on the situation in parliament and does not take into account opposition from beyond parliament.
The marriage between the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the ID, therefore, comes as no surprise. The DA and ID reached an understanding which would see the ID merge with the DA by 2014. These parties believe that the merger would create a stronger opposition, which would become the ruling party, with time. According to the DA leader Hellen Zille, the main goal of the merger is to offer a united electoral challenge to the ANC. One therefore would ask if this should really be the goal and aim of the DA as the opposition party rather than the enhancement of the quality of our democracy and to hold the ruling party to account.
Seemingly, the DA views itself as an official opposition to the ANC merely because it opposes almost everything that the ruling party does. If the past national elections are anything to go by, the DA is no longer content with its position as the lead opposition party, but it is gearing itself to take over from the ANC. Political commentator, Howard Barrel proclaimed that ‘if the first duty of an opposition party is to oppose, or at the very least test government policy at every turn, its second is presumably to become a ruling party. And as Barrel observed, none of the opposition parties appeared to have any chance of replacing the ANC as government any time soon.’
Analysts of the political discourse in South Africa argue that if the marriage between the ID and the DA is based on the premise that they are to rule in the near future, then it is founded on a shaky ground. What raises concern in this marriage is the fact that fundamentally, these two organisations differ in ideology. Before the merger, De Lille had been a strong critic of both the ANC and the DA. Speaking on their interpretation of their position as an opposition, De Lille had stated that unlike the DA, the ID had never felt comfortable with the idea of ‘opposition’- the idea that their existence was based on opposing something. She claimed that the ID was founded on the basis of positive values; of standing for something as opposed to against something.
The memorandum of understanding signed by the DA and the ID will see a gradual merger of the two parties and both parties will contest the 2011 local government elections under the banner of the DA. A formal merger will only be possible after the 2014 national elections, as constitutional amendments that abolished the floor-crossing would put ID members at risk of losing their seats in provincial legislatures and parliament.
In terms of the merger, elected representatives of the two parties will immediately start attending each other’s caucuses, while a joint committee of DA and ID representatives will oversee finances. An ‘appropriate number’ of ID representatives would be co-opted onto the DA’s highest decision-making bodies such as its National Management Committee, Federal Executive and Federal Council.
Most political analysts see the merger as a survival strategy for the ID after it took a beating during the last general elections, winning less than one percent of the votes and retaining only four of its seven seats in parliament. Meanwhile, the DA increased its political holdings, gaining 17 percent of the vote. The general belief therefore is that instead of watching her party die a slow death, De Lille made a strategic move to merge with the DA. Analysts, however, claim that this move will not necessarily strengthen the DA or even increase its membership. Infact, it is believed that it might have a negative impact.
Some ID members may lose faith in De Lille and feel let down and therefore not join the DA. For a long time the ID had been opposed to most ideological positions of the DA and to the anti-ANC stance that the DA had always held in its attempts to unseat the ruling party. The differences in the two parties have always been strong and therefore many ID members may not be won over to the DA that easily.
The alliance is likely to boost the opposition’s chances of taking control of more municipalities in the Western and Northern Cape, and in holding on to the Western Cape in 2014. This was evident during the recent by-elections in the Western Cape local municipalities where the DA won a majority of the votes in most local municipalities over the ANC. The ANC’s support amongst coloured voters in the Western Cape – even in rural areas – has collapsed dramatically. The ANC has become an African party with very little support amongst members of other race groups. Whether this has something to do with the behaviour of the notorious Julius Malema is not clear. What is clear from the by-elections is that in the Western Cape the ANC has alienated non-African black voters.
The DA seems to have made some gains amongst African voters; these gains are more pronounced in small rural towns than in big cities. The DA still has a lot of work to do to convince African voters that it could possibly represent their interests. The DA is well aware of this and the merger happens at a time when it is struggling to reshape its image as a party serving white and minority interests. Therefore, it sees such arrangements with smaller opposition parties as a means of extending its electoral influence into the townships. The DA is also talking with COPE but these talks have stalled since COPE’s descent into in-fighting and court battles. Besides, COPE must get a mandate from its members first. The UDM remains sceptical of the merger and like all of us, continues to watch the space.
It is not clear how long this marriage will last, but what is clear is that the DA is positioning itself well as the biggest force in opposition politics in the country. This may well be exactly what we need to get the ANC to refocus, and to realise that it should be accountable to the people. However, if the opposition hopes to unseat the ANC in the foreseeable future, the alliance must be broadened and confidence building intensified.